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When Does Foreign Direct Investment Lead to Inclusive Growth? 




Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is widely considered among the most effective 
instruments for the promotion of economic development. However, not all FDI leads to 
inclusive economic growth, lifting the welfare of the poorest groups in developing countries. 
This paper examines the conditions under which FDI can effectively lead to inclusive growth. 
By using a fixed effects regression with annual data for 68 countries from 1990 to 2015, we 
find that FDI has the most positive effect on inclusive growth when there is a sufficiently 
large manufacturing sector and a developed enough infrastructure base in the host country. 
These not very optimistic results emphasize the critical importance of the host country’s 
absorptive capacity. A smaller technological or knowledge gap with the foreign firms is 
required for FDI to lead to more linkages and spillovers, and ultimately job creation for the 
poor. The results cast doubt on development strategies that rely on FDI as a sufficient policy 
for inclusive growth. 
Keywords: FDI, Inclusive Growth, Manufacturing, Infrastructure, Structural Change 
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) is known to positively affect a host country’s economy, 
by creating knowledge, productivity, and technology spillovers and forward and backward 
linkages with local economic agents that lead to employment growth and local economic growth 
(Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Markusen & Venables, 1997; Javorcik, 2004; Ping & Saggi, 2007). 
Previous studies have shown that the extent of these benefits largely differs based on the nature, 
density, and depth of the linkages created with local firms, all of which depend on the absorptive 
capacity of the host country. In turn, additional studies have shown that a country’s absorptive 
capacity increases with the following factors: a small technological gap, the quality of the 
financial system, the quality of institutions, and higher levels of GDP per capita and education 
(Hermes & Lensink, 2003; Alfaro et al., 2004; Buchanan et al., 2012; Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 
2003).  
While these studies have estimated the extent to which FDI can benefit a host country’s 
economic growth based on the host country’s economic conditions or characteristics, to date 
there have been no studies specifically researching the question of how this dynamic may affect 
inclusive growth, that is, growth benefiting the lowest income groups in society. The main goal 
of this paper is to fill this gap. We use panel data for 68 countries between 1990-2015 to identify 
the economic conditions under which FDI leads to inclusive growth. Our results show that FDI 
leads to inclusive growth only when there are high levels of manufacturing and infrastructure in 
the host country. These not very optimistic results emphasize the critical importance of the host 
country’s absorptive capacity. A smaller technological or knowledge gap with the foreign firms is 
required for FDI to lead to more linkages and spillovers, and ultimately more job creation for 
the poor. Our empirical results are robust to different measures of GDP per capita and adjusted 
gross fixed capital formation (AGFCF), as well as to the exclusion of different control variables. 
Overall, our results cast doubt on development strategies that rely on FDI as a sufficient policy 





The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the literature on 
inclusive growth and the effectiveness of FDI. Section three develops the theoretical framework. 
Section four discusses the data and the empirical estimation approach. Section five presents the 
empirical results. Section six discusses the robustness checks, and section seven concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Two strands of the economic development literature are relevant to our research 
question: first, that studying inclusive growth, and second, that studying the economic 
conditions under which FDI most benefits a host country’s economy. 
Inclusive Growth 
In the 1990s, the term “inclusive growth” or “pro-poor growth”— i.e. gross domestic 
product growth that leads to poverty reduction (Habito, 2010) — was formally introduced by a 
number of studies that researched this question (Kakwani & Pernia, 2000; Ali & Son, 2007; 
Rauniyar & Kanbur, 2010). Various macroeconomic and policy factors have been discussed as 
potential determinants of inclusive growth including overall government expenditure, 
government spending on health and education, (general) economic growth, productive 
employment, infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, human capital or education level, 
structural changes, fixed investment, trade openness, and foreign direct investment (FDI) 
(Benabou, 2000; Saint-Paul & Verdier, 1993; Anand et al., 2013).  
The previous literature has well established that (general) growth that is broadly based is 
necessary for inclusive growth (for example, Ali and Zhuang 2007; Klasen 2010). Other studies 
have focused on how various government expenditures and fiscal policies may affect inclusive 
growth. For example, Benabou (2000) and Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) suggest that fiscal 
policies such as health and education spending can benefit the poor and enhance growth at the 
same time by improving human capital. Tella and Alimi (2016) use a fixed effects model for a 
panel of 14 African countries from 1995 to 2012 to also show that government spending focused 
on health financing was the key to improving rates of inclusive growth. Complementarily, 





component analysis (PCA) to generate a measure of inclusive growth and find that the size of 
government positively affects inclusive growth while public debt has a negative effect. For 
upper-middle and high income countries,  Muinelo-Gallo and Roca-Sagales' (2011), using an 
unbalanced panel of 43 countries between 1972-2006, find that increases in both government 
current expenditures and direct taxes reduce inequality but also negatively impact economic 
growth, while public investment is the only government policy that reduces inequality without 
harming output growth.  
Several studies support the positive effect of infrastructure on inclusive growth, 
especially in developing countries, which are generally characterized by low stocks of public 
infrastructure (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Vellala et al., 2014)). Using a panel of 100 countries 
from 1960 to 2005, Calderón and Servén (2010) find that the quantity and quality of telephones, 
roads, and electricity have a significant positive effect on growth and inequality, and specifically 
that the access of the poor to infrastructure was important for the positive effects on inequality. 
Similar findings are reported by Estache and Fay (2007) and López (2003).  
In addition, several studies have analyzed the effects of macroeconomic factors such as 
FDI, trade openness, inflation, and financial globalization on inclusive growth. Based on time 
series data for Nigeria from 1981 to 2014 and employing GDP per person employed as a 
measurement of inclusive growth, Oluseye and Gabriel (2017) use time series analysis to find 
that FDI and inflation have a positive effect on inclusive growth. In the long run, FDI still has a 
positive effect while government consumption, education expenditure, and inflation have a 
negative effect.1 Anand et al. (2013) find that macroeconomic stability, gross fixed capital 
formation, education, trade openness, human capital, and FDI are the foundations for inducing 
inclusive growth. Similarly, Ayinde and Yinusa (2016) focus on how government spending to 
achieve financial widening, financial development, greater trade openness, and capital 
 
1 In this regard, several other studies have found that spending on higher education that is disproportionate to basic 






investment may be conducive to inclusive growth. Aoyagi and Ganelli (2015) using a panel of 31 
countries between 1992 and 2011, find that fiscal redistribution, trade openness, and 
productivity positively impact inclusive growth, while inflation, GDP volatility, and 
unemployment have a negative effect.  
A smaller number of studies have analyzed investment by sector to determine which 
industrial sectors’ enhancement may lead to inclusive growth. For example, Ogbu (2012), 
observing the poverty problem in Nigeria, suggests how industrial policies focused on improving 
the manufacturing sector, in addition to government expenditure that is targeted at 
infrastructure investment and transforming the agriculture sector, may support inclusive 
growth. Balakrishnan et al. (2013), based on a sample of developing countries, find that besides 
expenditure on education and financial reform, increased employment in mining and quarrying, 
manufacturing, construction, and public utilities leads to increases in inclusive growth.  
Finally, there is a diversity of approaches in the literature for how to measure inclusive 
economic growth. For example, Aoyagi and Ganelli (2015) develop a proxy for inclusive growth 
that is the weighted average of growth in average income and the change in an equity index 
accounting for income distribution. Whajah et al. (2019) uses principal component analysis to 
generate a measure for inclusive growth based on data obtained for various indicators such as 
infrastructure, education, health, and unemployment. Anand et al. (2013) generate a proxy that 
is the weighted average of growth in average income and of the change in an equity index. Dollar 
& Kraay (2002) use the average income of the lowest 20% income quantile to study the effect of 
economic growth on poverty reduction, which was extended in their later study (Dollar, 
Kleineberg, & Kraay, 2016) to observe policies and institutions that are “pro-poor.” In this 
paper, we adopt Dollar & Kraay’s approach.  
Foreign Direct Investment  
Studies that have explored the effect of FDI on host country’s growth have shown in 





a growing number of studies have argued that this may be because FDI’s effect on growth 
depends on the characteristics of the host country that affect the nature and/or amount of 
linkages and spillovers created by the foreign firms behind those investments (Borensztein et al., 
1998; Nunnenkamp, 2004; Meyer, 2004;Meyer & Sinani, 2009). According to this literature, 
the spillovers and linkages are maximized when there is less of a gap between the home and host 
country in terms of technology, knowledge, various institutions, economic development etc., 
which enables the host country to have sufficient absorptive capacity. From this perspective, it is 
important to know the conditions of the local economy that help minimize obstacles for the 
interaction between foreign firms and local economic agents. For example, Rodriguez-Clare 
(1996) investigates the economic impact of multinationals in developing countries, by 
developing a two-country model and studying the generation of backward and forward linkages. 
One result from his model is that, other things equal, the linkage effect is higher when the host 
country is more economically developed and thus similar to the home country.  
Empirically, in this regard, Blomstrom et al. (1992) find that FDI’s impact on economic 
growth is positive only in higher-income developing countries, and de Mello (1997) suggests that 
a larger technological gap between the host and home country leads to a smaller impact of FDI 
on economic growth. Amendolagine et al. (2013) studied the factors determining the backward 
linkages of foreign manufacturing firms in 19 Sub-Saharan African countries, highlighting the 
micro and macro level factors that may lead to higher interactions between foreign subsidiaries 
and local firms. These authors find that foreign firms that have a knowledge base that is too 
developed compared to the absorptive capacity of the local economy are less likely to interact 
with domestic economic agents. Again, this implies that the host country needs to have a certain 
level of technological and knowledge base in order to benefit from FDI, instead of just merely 
attracting highly technologically sophisticated firms. These authors also find that the local 
economy’s institutional characteristics, such as a reliable legal system, are necessary for 





examine the role of FDI in technology diffusion and economic growth in developing countries by 
utilizing cross-country data. While they find that FDI is a vehicle for technology transfer and 
thus contributes to growth, the effect of FDI on economic growth depends on the level of human 
capital in the host country. Further, other studies have shown that a developed financial system 
is important for spillovers and linkages from FDI to materialize (Hermes and Lensink, 2003; 
Alfaro et al., 2004).  
 Other host country characteristics also appear to matter. Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2003) 
find that the relationship between FDI and growth critically depends on a local economy’s 
characteristics, such as GDP per capita, level of education, and openness to trade. In analyzing 
the factors behind the backward linkages created by Japanese electronics manufacturing 
affiliates in 24 countries, Belderbos et al. (2001) find that good quality infrastructure and a large 
manufacturing sector positively affect the creation of local linkages.  
In summary, the combination of the factors or conditions found in the previous 
literature affecting inclusive growth and the impact of FDI on (general) growth point to a rather 
strict set of conditions that may be needed for FDI to lead to inclusive economic growth. In the 
next section we explore theoretically what those linkages may be, which we then test empirically 
in the following sections.  
3. Theoretical Framework 
The review of the literature shows that the effects of FDI on a host country’s economy are 
optimized under certain economic and industrial conditions, namely a diversified industrial 
base and a developed infrastructure, among others. An important mechanism that is created 
under these conditions is the enhanced knowledge or technological compatibility between the 
local and foreign firms, i.e. more linkages are created and local economic agents have the 
absorptive capacity to benefit from the technological and knowledge spillovers brought by FDI. 
The review of the literature on inclusive growth also indicates largely the same economic 





to take place. Therefore, we hypothesize that FDI will benefit the host country not only through 
(general) economic growth, but also inclusive growth when the host country has a certain level 
of diversified industrial base and a developed infrastructure. Inclusive growth would take place 
through the channels of technology and knowledge transfer, enhanced productivity and work 
force skills, and newly generated businesses and jobs. More specifically, the hypothesis we will 
test is that the positive effects of FDI on inclusive growth will increase when there is a large 
manufacturing sector and a developed infrastructure base in the host country.  
4. Data and Methodology  
The empirical analysis covers the period 1990 to 2015, utilizing a panel of 68 countries, 
consisting of 31 high income, 24 upper middle income, 12 lower middle income, and 1 low 
income countries, all listed in Table A-1 in the Appendix. It would have been desirable to have 
additional low income countries in the sample, but there were limitations due to missing data.  
The dependent variable, inclusive growth, is defined as the average growth of the bottom 
20% quantile of the income distribution. The data for computing the average income of the 
bottom 20% is retrieved from the World Bank’s PovcalNet database, which has the data 
available converted into constant 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars. The average 
income data are from primary household survey data, where roughly half report income and the 
other half report consumption expenditure.  
In order to test our basic hypothesis, we use a fixed effects model with the main part of 
the model being a three-way interaction of FDI inflows, the manufacturing level, and adjusted 
gross fixed capital formation (AGFCF) level also in the host country.2 Here, manufacturing is a 
proxy for the diversification and AGFCF is a proxy for infrastructure. Our interest is to find at 
what threshold levels of manufacturing and AGFCF would FDI have a positive effect on inclusive 
growth. The data for the interaction terms as well as the other controls covariates are from 
 
2 Note that FDI is subtracted from total gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) to arrive at AGFCF. This is further 





World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), except for corruption, which is from 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Details of each indicator can be found in Table A-1 of 
Appendix, and Table 1 shows the summary statistics.  
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
  Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ln(Avg Income of bottom 20%) 1,512 7.8353 1.1033 4.4429 10.0651 
FDI 5,577 3.8887 11.5782 0.0000 451.7160 
Manufacturing 5,240 13.5159 6.8242 0.0000 50.6373 
Agriculture 5,715 16.5135 13.4759 0.2241 79.0424 
Services 5,304 49.7030 11.8416 9.7275 88.7243 
AGFCF 5,189 19.7657 7.7922 0.2132 89.0564 
Ln(GDPPC) 4,575 8.8445 1.1544 5.8891 11.4913 
∆(Inflation) 5,413 1.1036 19.9528 -223.0357 1076.5350 
Corruption 3,674 5.8878 3.5403 0.0000 12.0000 
Trade Openness 5,534 77.3467 47.3309 0.0210 442.6200 
Unemployment 2,973 8.5990 6.4900 0.0500 57.0000 
Tax Revenue  3,437 17.2015 6.9412 0.0216 62.8586 
Government Expense 5,108 16.1302 6.5554 0.0000 76.2221 
 
The base estimation model is given by: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 (𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼20%𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1) = 𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +
 𝛽𝛽7𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 +  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
The dependent variable (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 (𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼20%𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1)) is the log of average income of the lowest 
20% income quantile. As we saw in the review of the literature above, inclusive growth has been 
measured in different ways. Among those multiple measures we select the simple form that 
captures the income growth of the lowest income group in the economy. This measurement as 
mentioned above was used by Dollar, Kleineberg, and Kraay (2016). FDI is measured as 
percentage of GDP, as is manufacturing, services, and agriculture. In addition, AGFCF also as 
percentage of GDP is our proxy for infrastructure development. GFCF is a good representation 
for the level of infrastructure development, as it includes construction of roads, railways, 
schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial 
buildings; land improvements (drainage etc.); and plant, machinery and equipment purchases. 
However, since FDI is included in GFCF (when it results in the purchase of new assets—it is not 






or for brownfield FDI), we subtract FDI from GFCF so to use adjusted GFCF in our estimations.3 
This is a safe conservative estimate and it prevents multicollinearity and double counting 
issues.4  
The other control variables added in equation (1) are those found in the previous 
literature to play a significant role on inclusive growth. They include the log of GDP per capita, 
which controls for a country’s level of economic development, total government expenditure as 
percentage of GDP controlling for government size, tax revenue as percentage of GDP 
controlling for tax effort, and percentage change in the inflation rate controlling for 
macroeconomic stability. In addition, unemployment is included as an important factor 
affecting poverty levels; and lastly, corruption and trade openness (measured as total of exports 
and imports as percentage of GDP) are additional macroeconomic and political factors that have 
been found to potentially influence inclusive growth.  
As discussed above, the variable of interest in our model is the three-way interaction of 
FDI, manufacturing, and AGFCF, which will show how FDI affects inclusive growth under 
different levels of manufacturing and AGFCF. As with all equations that include a three-way 
interaction, we also add these three variables separately, as well as the two-way interactions of 
FDI, manufacturing, and AGFCF. Finally, we also add the two-way interaction of 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. This 
will account for the fact that an increase in manufacturing as percentage of GDP would generally 
mean a decrease in agriculture as percentage of GDP, and vice-versa. This is explained in further 
detail below as we look into the marginal effect analysis. 
For the estimation of our model in equation (1), we use a two-way (country and time 
 
3 The adjustment can be quite significant depending on the country. For example, among EU 
members, Slovakia received more than one-third of GFCF via FDI between 2000 and 2007; Bulgaria 
received more than 50% of GFCF via FDI between 2003 and 2008; in Russia, FDI represented more than 
10% GFCF after 2003(Estrin, 2017); FDI also constitutes a large share of GFCF in several African 
countries. The share of FDI in GFCF was at least one-third in Congo, DRC, Ghana, Madagascar, and 
Nigeria (World Bank 2014). 
4. We eliminate the cases where AGFCF becomes negative. It must be noted also that our measurement of 






effects) fixed effects regression. Fixed effects will deal with omitted variable bias and control for 
cross-country heterogeneity in addition to period-specific factors. The unobserved country-
specific effects may capture the differences in initial levels of efficiency, while the period-specific 
intercepts capture changes that happen across all countries, such as productivity. All 
explanatory variables are lagged one year to reflect the time needed for FDI to impact the local 
economy.  
5. Empirical Results  
The results of the fixed effects regression are shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. Fixed Effects Regression 
 Ln(Average Income of Bottom 20% Quantile) (t+1) Standard Error 
Manufacturing 0.0296** (0.0127) 
Agriculture 0.000411 (0.0136) 
Services 0.00160 (0.00859) 
FDI 0.0326* (0.0166) 
AGFCF 0.0363*** (0.0118) 
FDI*Manufacturing -0.000867 (0.000758) 
FDI*Agriculture -0.00376*** (0.00134) 
FDI*AGFCF -0.000791 (0.00105) 
Manufacturing*AGFCF -0.00156*** (0.000478) 
FDI*Manufacturing*AGFCF 0.0000654 (0.0000441) 
Ln(GDPPC) 0.946*** (0.265) 
∆(Inflation) 0.000935* (0.000548) 
Corruption -0.00927 (0.0135) 
Trade Openness -0.000892 (0.000696) 
Unemployment -0.00372 (0.00632) 
Tax Revenue 0.00941 (0.00650) 
Government Expense -0.00216 (0.00941) 
Observations 528  
R-squared 0.763  
Number of countries 67  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Our main variable of interest is the three-way interaction term that includes FDI, the 
extent of manufacturing in the host country, and adjusted gross fixed capital formation (AGFCF) 
also in the host country. In order to interpret the results of this three-way interaction variable, 
we employ the marginal effect analysis (Dawson & Richter, 2006), which will show how the 





AGFCF.5 In this approach, we compute the different slopes representing the effect of FDI on 
inclusive growth when the moderating variables, manufacturing and AGFCF, are held constant 
at different combinations of high or low values. To get started with the analysis, it is helpful to 
reorder the model in equation (1) into those that contain FDI and those that do not as the 
following:  
ln (𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼20%𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1) = (𝛽𝛽1 +  𝛽𝛽6𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 
(𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽) 
The first group is what will define the different slopes of FDI; by combining high or low values of 
manufacturing, AGFCF, and agriculture, the slope representing the effect of FDI on inclusive 
growth will differ. In the analysis, high values of manufacturing, AGFCF, and agriculture are 
defined as one standard deviation above their respective means and low values as one standard 
deviation below their respective means; where the mean values (recall, presented as percent of 
GDP) are 16.721, 18.793, and , 6.425 respectively, and the standard deviations are 5.507, 5.981, 
and 4.776, respectively. The four cases that the analysis will show are listed in Table 3. 
Table 3. Levels of Manufacturing, Agriculture, AGFCF in Each Scenario  
   Level 
 High Manufacturing 22.228 
1 High AGFCF 24.774 
 Low Agriculture 1.649 
 High Manufacturing 22.228 
2 Low AGFCF 12.812 
 Low Agriculture 1.649 
 Low Manufacturing 11.214 
3 High AGFCF 24.774 
 High Agriculture 11.201 
 Low Manufacturing 11.214 
4 Low AGFCF 12.812 
 High Agriculture 11.201 
 
There are a couple of reasons why we only look at the combinations of either high level of 
manufacturing and low level of agriculture, or low level of agriculture and high level of 
manufacturing, and exclude the cases of both high levels of manufacturing and agriculture or 
 






low levels of manufacturing and agriculture. First, again, these variables are expressed in terms 
of percent of GDP, and thus if a share of one sector increases, there will be a decrease in the 
share of the other sector. Also, an economy that goes through structural change usually 
transitions from having a large agriculture sector and a small manufacturing sector to 
developing a larger manufacturing sector while the agriculture sector relatively decreases, and 
so the cases will represent either of these states. For the same reasons, our marginal effects 
analysis consists of three moderating variables — manufacturing, agriculture, AGFCF — and not 
two as in the general case, making it a more holistic analysis.7 
Table 4 and Figure 1 show the differing slopes in each scenario listed in Table 3. In the 
first scenario where there is a high level of manufacturing, a high level of infrastructure, and a 
low level of agriculture, a 1 percent increase in FDI as percentage of GDP leads to an 
approximately 2.4 percent increase in the average income of the bottom 20 percent. In the 
second scenario, where there is high manufacturing, low infrastructure, and low agriculture, a 1 
percent increase in FDI as percentage of GDP leads to a 1.6 percent increase in the average 
income of the bottom 20 percent. In the third and fourth scenario with low manufacturing, 
either high or low infrastructure, and high agriculture, the effects are both approximately a 2 
percent decline in the average income of the bottom 20 percent income decile.  
Thus, the effect of FDI on inclusive growth is most positive when there are both high 
levels of manufacturing and infrastructure. These results strongly support the prediction that 
FDI will have the most positive effect on inclusive growth when the host country has a large 
manufacturing and infrastructure base. This may be explained by the degree of spillover effects 
and linkages created based on the different characteristics of the host country. As we reviewed in 
the previous literature, technological and knowledge spillovers and linkages with the local 
economy are maximized when there is a smaller technological or knowledge gap between the 
 
7 We do not include the service sector, as adding the manufacturing, agriculture, and service sector variables that are in 





home and host country due to increased absorptive capacity. This will ultimately lead to 
business and job creations and benefit the lowest-income groups.  
The negative effect of FDI on inclusive growth when there are low levels of 
manufacturing and high levels of agriculture may be explained by a couple of factors. First, as 
Agosin and Mayer (2000) show, higher total FDI stocks can be associated with lower 
subsequent growth in countries with unfavorable characteristics. This is because FDI crowds out 
domestic investment, due to reasons such as overall weak investment, and has less stimulation 
on creating forward and backward linkages. A second reason could be that countries with high 
levels of agriculture and low levels of manufacturing tend to attract resource-seeking FDI, which 
are commonly concentrated in foreign-dominated enclaves that have few linkages to the local 
product and labor markets. In addition, in this case, economic benefits can also be easily 
embezzled by corrupt local elites, and thus resource-seeking FDI in the primary sector may lead 
the country into some form of “Dutch Disease” (Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2003). Thus, the 
benefits may not be as easily transferred to the local economy, especially to the low income 
groups. However, our data do not allow us to differentiate among different types of FDI, and so 
those possible explanations have to remain just conjectures.  
Table 4. Average Marginal Effects of FDI on Average Income of Bottom 20%  
  dy/dx Std. Err. P>z 
1 0.0235305 0.0083552 0.005 
2 0.015607 0.005705 0.006 
3 -0.0206773 0.0091602 0.024 
4 -0.0199871 0.0107601 0.063 















Figure 1. Marginal Effect of FDI on Average Income of Bottom 20%  
 
 Regarding the results for the control variables, the log of GDP per capita has a significant 
and the strongest effect on inclusive growth. For a 1 percent increase in GDP per capita, the 
average income of the bottom 20 percent increases by 0.95 percent. When we compare the 
results with Table 6 where we conduct robustness check by excluding different control variables, 
the results are consistently strongly significant and of similar magnitudes. This confirms the 
results in the previous literature that (general) growth generates inclusive growth and suggests 
that there is almost a one-to-one transfer of wealth to the lowest income group. Percentage 
change in the inflation rate shows a positive and significant effect on inclusive growth, which 
conflicts with several previous findings in the literature (Aoyagi and Ganelli, 2015). The result 





response to 1 percent change in the percentage change of inflation rate.8 The results in Table 6 
consistently show a positive effect with a similar magnitude; however, in some of the models it 
loses statistical significance. Oluseye and Gabriel (2017) found a similar result, with inflation 
having a positive effect on inclusive growth in the short-run but a negative effect in the long-run. 
While our results reflect the effect of inflation in the short run based on the one-year time lag 
between the independent and dependent variable, inflation, which proxies for macroeconomic 
stability, may have a negative effect in the longer run as in Oluseye and Gabriel (2017).   
Corruption shows a negative effect, which is unexpected—higher value means less 
corruption in the ICRG index—but it is insignificant, and the coefficient changes to a positive 
effect in some of the models in Table 6. Trade openness shows a negative effect on inclusive 
growth but it is also not statistically significant. It consistently stays negative in the results in 
Table 6, and turns significant in one of the models; a 1 percent change in trade openness as a 
percentage of GDP leads to a 0.16% decrease in the average income of the bottom 20% in model 
3. While the general notion is that international trade leads to economic progress and poverty 
alleviation, there are conflicting studies that show otherwise. Onakoya et al. (2019) show that 
trade openness negatively impacts economic growth and poverty levels when there is high 
dependency on imports, which deters the development of domestic production. Similarly, 
George (2010) provides an example of unbridled liberalization in agriculture in developing 
countries could lead to increased dependence on food imports and thus a rise in poverty. Some 
studies also show that the gains from trade may not be equitably distributed (Stewart and Berry, 
2000; Yusuf et al., 2013).  
Unemployment has the expected negative effect in the main model and all the models in 
Table 6 but is not significant. Tax revenue, which proxies for tax effort, also has the expected 
positive effect in all models, but it is not significant. Government expense, which proxies for 
 
8 The percentage change in inflation rate was calculated as the following: 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1−𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡
. Since we did not 





government size, shows a negative effect in the main model, and turns positive in one of the 
models in Table 6, but is not significant. This insignificancy result may be due to the variety of 
ways governments allocate their budgets, which include areas that may not necessarily lead to 
increasing the average income of the bottom 20%, such as national defense and security.  
6. Robustness Checks 
 Table A-2 in the Appendix shows the correlation matrix of some of the main variables. 
The low correlation of the variables counters the possibilities of high correlation that may be 
potentially present between some of the variables; those of FDI and Ln(GDPPC), manufacturing 
and Ln(GDPPC), AGFCF and Ln(GDPPC), Avg Inc Bottom 20% and FDI, Avg Inc Bottom 20% 
and manufacturing, and Avg Inc Bottom 20% and AGFCF are all very low. This implies a low 
possibility for multicollinearity issues in our model.  
 Table 5 shows results of a robustness check where we conduct fixed effects regression on 
six models that exclude one of the control variables: corruption, trade openness, unemployment, 
tax revenue, government expense, and inflation. While significance is reduced, all the models 
confirm the results of our original model by showing similar results, especially in terms of the 
three-way interaction, as seen in Figure 2.  
Table 5. Robustness Check: Excluding Different Control Variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Manu-
facturing 
0.016993 0.030485* 0.002546 0.009593 0.032866**  0.023985 
(0.01327) (0.01287) (0.01668) (0.01539) (0.01224) (0.01259) 
Agriculture 
-0.000452 0.001209 -0.011845 -0.005774 -0.005091 -0.000012 
(0.01365) (0.01361) (0.00864) (0.00949) (0.01288) (0.01199) 
Services 
0.001718 0.002038 -0.00976 -0.004166 -0.000028 -0.003168 
(0.00853) (0.00876) (0.00737) (0.00773) (0.00870) (0.00843) 
FDI 
0.017594 0.034002* 0.019261 0.033672 0.041808**  0.029085 
(0.01682) (0.01681) (0.01966) (0.01905) (0.01400) (0.01638) 
AGFCF 
0.021967 0.037816** 0.013042 0.026554* 0.037432*** 0.031749** 
(0.01162) (0.01210) (0.01319) (0.01088) (0.01078) (0.01190) 
FDI* Manu-
facturing 
-0.000475 -0.000863 -0.000855 -0.001121 -0.001644**  -0.000819 
(0.00078) (0.00076) (0.00097) (0.00095) (0.00061) (0.00074) 
FDI* 
Agriculture 
-0.002658* -0.003787** -0.002076 -0.003595** -0.002079 -0.003741** 
(0.00131) (0.00137) (0.00107) (0.00134) (0.00121) (0.00129) 
FDI* AGFCF 
-0.000185 -0.000851 -0.000383 -0.001176 -0.00105 -0.000681 
(0.00109) (0.00107) (0.00109) (0.00106) (0.00064) (0.00107) 










0.000037 0.000066 0.000038 0.000084 0.000065 0.000064 
(0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00004) 
Ln 
(GDPPC) 
0.950921*** 0.914965*** 0.990179*** 0.753311*** 0.922121*** 0.952652*** 
(0.27153) (0.25680) (0.19227) (0.19900) (0.25620) (0.27077) 
Corruption 
 -0.012249 0.003389 -0.005201 -0.006578 0.000796 
 (0.01407) (0.01239) (0.01444) (0.01367) (0.01417) 
Trade 
Openness 
-0.001002  -0.001582* -0.000936 -0.000899 -0.001339 
(0.00070)  (0.00075) (0.00065) (0.00079) (0.00084) 
Unemploy-
ment 
-0.00714 -0.003919  -0.009454 -0.003396 -0.004769 
(0.00596) (0.00630)  (0.00531) (0.00638) (0.00617) 
Tax Revenue 
0.009392 0.009281 0.002506  0.010044 0.009562 
(0.00598) (0.00646) (0.00524)  (0.00634) (0.00654) 
Government 
Expense 
-0.000117 -0.003031 -0.003492 0.001153         -0.003893 
(0.00902) (0.00954) (0.00845) (0.00608)         (0.00915) 
∆(Inflation) 
0.001113* 0.000852 0.000868 0.000636 0.001047*   
(0.00052) (0.00052) (0.00045) (0.00054) (0.00045)  
Observations 566 528 673 630 545 538 
R-squared 0.758915 0.762001 0.731144 0.784937 0.754896 0.75934 
No. countries  77 67 78 76 69 68 
Figure 2. Robustness Check: Excluding Different Control Variables  
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Table 6 shows the results of another robustness check that uses lagged GDPPC instead of 
GDPPC to account for potential multicollinearity issues with FDI, and the results are again 
similar.  
Table 6. Robustness Check: Using Lagged GDPPC & Lagged AGFCF 
 Ln(Average income of bottom 20% quantile) (t+1)  Standard Error 
Manufacturing 0.0327** (0.0134) 
Agriculture -0.0014 (0.0127) 
Services -0.000436 (0.00818) 
FDI 0.0348* (0.0178) 
AGFCF 0.0399*** (0.0127) 
FDI*Manufacturing -0.000744 (0.00079) 
FDI*Agriculture -0.00385*** (0.00138) 
FDI* AGFCF -0.000782 (0.00111) 
Manufacturing* AGFCF -0.00157*** (0.000515) 
FDI*Manufacturing* AGFCF 0.0000638 (0.0000463) 
Lagged Ln(GDPPC) 0.811*** (0.238) 
∆(Inflation) 0.00102 (0.000618) 
Corruption -0.0107 (0.0131) 





Unemployment -0.00556 (0.0061) 
Tax Revenue 0.009 (0.00633) 
Government Expense -0.00262 (0.0093) 
Observations 527  
Number of countries 67  
R-squared 0.755  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
To check the robustness of the marginal effect analysis, we did a pairwise comparison of 
the average marginal effects; table 7 shows the results of testing the differences in the simple 
slopes. The results show that all the pairwise comparisons are strongly significant except for 
one, which adds validation to the results of our marginal effect analysis.  
Table 7. Pairwise Comparison of Average Marginal Effects  
FDI dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 
4 vs 3 0.0006902 0.007237 0.10 0.924 
1 vs 3 0.0442079 0.0140214 3.15 0.002 
2 vs 3 0.0362843 0.0119615 3.03 0.002 
1 vs 4 0.0435177 0.0169047 2.57 0.010 
2 vs 4 0.0355942 0.0140616 2.53 0.011 
2 vs 1 -0.0079235 0.0039795 -1.99 0.046 
*y denotes average income of bottom 20% income group; x denotes FDI.  
7. Conclusion 
The main question researched in this paper is to identify the conditions under which FDI 
can lead to inclusive economic growth. By using a fixed effects regression with annual data for 
68 countries from 1990 to 2015, our empirical results indicate that the effect of FDI on inclusive 
growth is most positive when the host country has as a large manufacturing sector and a 
developed infrastructure base. This finding is shown through the results of the marginal effects 
analysis, where the effect of FDI on inclusive growth becomes most positive with high levels of 
manufacturing and infrastructure. 
From a policy viewpoint, these are not very optimistic results. Relying on FDI to reduce 
poverty and lift the lowest income groups in society will only work when the host country has 
sufficient absorptive capacity already in place. Many of the countries most in need of inclusive 
growth do not have such capacity currently. Nevertheless, FDI can still indirectly contribute to 





well as on developing the manufacturing sector and the gross capital formation of the host 
country. In hindsight, our results may help explain why many African countries that have had an 
exponential influx of FDI over the last few decades have not yet been able to fully benefit from 
said investment, from the perspective of inclusive growth, and are still struggling with severe 
poverty problems. The development of the manufacturing sector and building quality 
infrastructure need to be part of the policy agenda for FDI to contribute to poverty alleviation 
more effectively.  
 Further research is needed to overcome some limitations of the current study. First, it 
would be very desirable to overcome current data limitations so to be able to enlarge the sample 
of countries, especially to include more low-income countries. Second, better disaggregated data 
are needed to be able to decompose different types and modalities of FDIs (mode of entry, kind 
of investment, sectoral spread, etc.) and so to be able to discern how the different types of FDI 
affect inclusive growth.  







Table A-1. Countries in Final Sample 
   Obs. Manufac. Ag. AGFCF FDI GDPPC 
High income   15.1416   2.4912 17.4942  5.0339  35,184.3868  
Croatia 8 13.9485 4.7108 18.4219 5.2942 18,070.8250 
Estonia 8 13.7396 2.8743 18.7827 8.7009 25,239.0625 
Finland 4 18.0348 2.3202 16.9379 5.9235 40,993.0750 
Greece 13 8.4099 3.5442 19.0054 0.8108 28,182.5308 
Hungary 6 19.0143 3.8626 13.2154 8.8422 22,815.8000 
Iceland 11 11.0225 5.8828 14.2655 6.9631 40,368.4545 
Ireland 9 20.4700 1.1317 8.0351 16.0265 46,433.5444 
Japan 1 22.0760 1.0609 23.6387 0.4791 36,697.2000 
Korea, Rep. 4 26.3767 2.4797 29.7046 1.0296 28,350.4500 
Latvia 11 11.3229 3.5488 22.7889 4.5096 19,379.7364 
Lithuania 12 17.1894 3.6283 18.4950 2.8611 21,445.1667 
Luxembourg 3 6.6066 0.3067 6.2108 13.3058 91,838.5333 
Malta 3 10.8000 1.2726 9.8424 7.7757 29,806.3000 
Norway 12 7.7864 1.3474 18.2472 3.1641 62,570.0917 
Poland 19 16.5376 3.0824 17.2103 3.5386 18,462.0789 
Portugal 13 12.1970 2.1671 16.6913 4.0479 26,600.7769 
Slovak Republic 12 19.9575 3.4934 20.5655 3.9522 22,390.6917 
Slovenia 11 19.7903 1.9569 22.2796 1.7274 28,093.1636 
Spain 6 12.2804 2.3419 18.7576 2.3564 31,701.9000 
Sweden 9 17.3192 1.3746 18.5115 3.9393 41,794.0556 
United States 4 12.0483 1.0427 18.5470 1.9038 50,725.5000 
Uruguay 21 14.8201 7.8573 13.1869 3.7686 14,524.0667 
Austria 5 16.5439 1.2705 20.5134 2.1336 44,041.8400 
Belgium 6 14.5756 0.8460 9.9342 12.4495 40,440.1667 
Canada 6 13.7406 1.7024 19.2065 2.5567 38,539.8833 
Chile 11 15.1321 5.2999 17.0617 6.7225 15,735.2264 
Cyprus 4 5.6823 2.0956 15.7603 9.5534 35,157.0500 
Czech Republic 6 22.0948 2.0895 22.5443 3.5416 28,496.7167 
Denmark 4 11.4471 1.2076 17.3416 1.7942 44,351.9000 
Germany 4 19.6834 0.7211 18.0431 1.6327 41,425.5250 
Switzerland 5 18.7413 0.7060 18.5743 4.7474 56,044.6800 
Upper middle income   16.9205  8.4696  21.1365  3.4950  11,421.1539  
Dominican Republic 8 15.2608 5.8277 20.5687 4.1529 11,446.6000 
Guatemala 1 19.0785 10.6330 11.7417 2.5127 7,005.2100 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 3 14.5708 6.5046 29.4521 1.1206 16,193.4333 
Jamaica 4 9.9564 6.7757 19.7980 5.0048 8,178.0775 
Jordan 4 14.8562 2.6179 18.1461 8.5903 8,107.1100 
Malaysia 7 25.8437 9.7629 22.2048 3.9442 20,035.0429 
Mexico 9 17.6813 4.0910 18.2267 2.3369 15,384.7778 
Namibia 1 10.0249 6.6893 29.9284 3.4881 10,030.1000 
Paraguay 5 18.9293 12.0553 18.0514 0.7099 8,563.5500 
Peru 5 15.1569 8.2177 17.8210 3.7976 6,362.1380 
Romania 16 21.4059 9.2187 20.7205 4.1560 14,805.8750 
Russian Federation 13 13.6679 4.0121 17.6439 2.6894 21,797.8692 
South Africa 5 14.6882 2.6912 17.3393 1.6858 11,217.6640 
Sri Lanka 6 16.6952 14.3758 23.5805 1.2970 7,349.1550 
Thailand 16 28.7747 9.7584 23.8656 3.3125 11,389.9238 
Albania 2 4.9197 19.3822 27.1406 6.4403 8,604.4250 
Armenia 2 9.5537 18.1738 18.5113 3.8943 7,611.0900 
Belarus 18 25.6506 9.2760 26.6771 2.3771 12,125.3211 
Brazil 10 13.5892 4.9207 15.1846 2.9222 12,521.2200 





China 7 31.4802 9.3023 41.0280 3.3025 10,214.8529 
Colombia 12 13.6599 7.5921 16.5287 3.3228 10,707.3683 
Costa Rica 22 17.7568 10.0436 15.5641 4.7482 10,172.3645 
Dominican Republic 6 19.9827 6.9168 19.2027 3.7321 8,753.5250 
Lower middle income    16.7867 13.4951  20.0611  3.6086  5,598.9416  
Egypt, Arab Rep. 5 16.2503 13.7513 14.9509 3.3282 8,524.8000 
El Salvador 13 17.2189 6.2833 14.5098 2.2954 6,191.6438 
Ghana 1 11.3670 20.2472 22.7555 6.4909 3,786.9600 
Honduras 13 17.9140 12.2555 19.1613 6.2208 3,900.9877 
India 1 17.0299 17.0265 31.5950 1.6350 4,451.2300 
Indonesia 12 24.2565 14.7535 27.3264 1.7838 8,069.9375 
Moldova 13 11.8132 12.4907 19.4965 5.5755 4,646.5654 
Philippines 8 22.9049 15.0674 19.2987 1.6351 4,834.5975 
Tunisia 3 16.3394 9.6020 21.2945 2.3112 8,687.9700 
Ukraine 15 14.6177 9.3709 15.1931 4.0611 7,504.4720 
Bangladesh 1 16.4802 17.1046 25.3266 0.8795 2,412.5000 
Bolivia 4 15.2478 13.9877 9.8244 7.0869 4,175.6350 
Low income   5.5667  41.1782  22.1310  1.1808  1,423.5500  
Togo 1 5.5667 41.1782 22.1310 1.1808 1,423.5500 
Grand Total 528 16.7205 6.4247 18.7928 4.1435 20,091.1467 
 
Table A-2. Correlation Matrix 
 
Avg Inc  
Bottom 
20% FDI Manufac. Ag. Ser. 
Ln 
(GDPPC) AGFCF Unemp. 
Avg Inc  
Bottom 
20% 1       
 
FDI 0.1353 1       
Manuf. -0.1795 -0.2239 1      
Ag. -0.6731 -0.0962 0.1079 1     
Services 0.5019 0.1374 -0.3878 -0.6524 1    
Ln 
(GDPPC) 0.8681 0.1043 -0.1247 -0.8261 0.5522 1  
 
AGFCF -0.0796 -0.4292 0.2915 0.0975 -0.2954 -0.0922 1  
Unemp. -0.0716 0.0164 -0.2912 -0.0809 0.1516 -0.054 -0.2009 1 
 
Table A-3. Description of Variables 
Variable Description 
Foreign direct investment  
as percentage of GDP 
Foreign direct investment is measured as a percentage of GDP 
and obtained from World Bank WDI (World Development 
Indicators). It is the net inflows of investment that acquires a 
long-term management interest (10 percent or more of the 
voting stock) in an enterprise operating in a country other 
than that of the investor. It is the total of equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short- 
term capital. This indicator reflects net inflows (new 
investment inflows less disinvestment) from foreign investors 






as percentage of GDP 
Agriculture refers to ISIC divisions 1-5 that include forestry, 
hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and 
livestock production.  
Service as percentage of GDP 
Services refer to ISIC divisions 50-99, which include value 
added in wholesale and retail trade (including hotel and 
restaurants), transport, and government, financial, 
professional, and personal services such as education, health 
care, and real estate services. It also includes imputed bank 
service charges and import duties.  
Manufacturing  
as percentage of GDP 
Manufacturing refers to industries that belong to ISIC 
divisions 15-37. The measurement is in terms of value added, 
which is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs 
and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is measured without 
taking deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
Gross fixed capital formation  
as percentage of GDP 
It includes land improvements (fences, ditches, drains etc.); 
plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the 
construction of roads, railways, schools, offices, hospitals, 
private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial 
buildings. Net acquisitions of valuables are also considered 
capital formation according to the 1993 SNA.  
Trade openness as 
percentage of GDP 
This is calculated as the total of exports and imports divided 
by GDP. Imports of goods and services reflect the value of all 
goods and other market services received from the rest of the 
world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, 
insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other 
services, such as communication, construction, financial, 
information, business, personal, and government services. 
They exclude compensation of employees and investment 
income (formerly called factor services) and transfer 
payments. Exports of goods and services represent the value 
of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of 
the world. The specifics are the same as above.  
Tax revenue as percentage of 
GDP 
Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the central 
government for public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers 
such as fines, penalties, and most social security contributions 
are excluded. Refunds and corrections of erroneously 
collected tax revenue are treated as negative revenue. 
General government final 
consumption expenditure as 
percentage of GDP 
This indicator includes all government current expenditures 
for purchases of goods and services (including compensation 
of employees). It also includes most expenditures on national 
defense and security but excludes government military 
expenditures that are part of government capital formation. 
Percentage change in 
inflation rate 
This is calculated as the following: 𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡+1−𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡
, and 
reflects the annual percentage change in inflation. Inflation 
here is based on the consumer price index and reflects the 
annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer 
of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed 





Log of GDP per capita in 
constant 2011 PPP $ 
GDP is converted to international dollars using purchasing 
power parity rates. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy 
plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included 
in the value of the products.  
Unemployment as 
percentage of total labor 
force 
This refers to the share of the labor force that is without work 
but available for and seeking employment.  
Corruption 
The corruption indicator is based on the perception of foreign 
investors of how corrupt a country is. It ranges from numbers 
1 to 6, where higher numbers mean a country is less corrupt.  
 
*Corruption is from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), all other indicators are from 
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